Consider a mechanism design setting in which agents acquire costly information about an unknown, payoff-relevant state of nature. Information gathering is covert. We investigate conditions under which (i) efficient implementation and (ii) full surplus extraction are Bayesian incentive compatible and interim individually rational.
Introduction
We consider a mechanism design setting in which multiple agents may acquire costly information about an unknown, payoff-relevant state of nature. A mechanism proposed by the mechanism designer includes not only a social choice function (from agents' reported information to a social outcome) but also a set of instructions from the mechanism designer to each agent as to how much information to acquire. Agents acquire costly information covertly before deciding whether to accept the mechanism. The mechanism designer implements an outcome based on agents' reported signals. An agent's utility is a function of the outcome, the state of nature, and the cost of acquired information. As the state of nature is not observed perfectly and every signal is informative about the state of nature, this leads to an interdependent values setting. We investigate conditions under which (i) efficiency and (ii) full surplus extraction are Bayesian incentive compatible and interim individually rational.
An example of our model is an auction where values have an unobservable common component. In most papers on auctions and on trading mechanisms, it is assumed that agents are endowed with some information and may not acquire any more. This assumption is implausible in many settings as agents can usually acquire information at a cost without being observed by other agents or the mechanism designer.
A social choice rule suggests a profile of information acquisitions to agents and maps agents' reported information to an outcome. A mechanism is a social choice rule together with a payment function that maps reported information to each agent's payment.
A social choice rule is ex post efficient if it selects an ex post efficient outcome after every realization of information at the suggested level of information acquisition. It is ex ante efficient if it is ex post efficient and suggests a level of information acquisition that maximizes the sum of (ex ante) expected utilities net of information acquisition costs. A mechanism fully extracts surplus if its social choice rule is efficient 1 and each agent's interim expected surplus is zero. A social choice rule is implementable if it is a part of a mechanism that is Bayesian incentive compatible and interim individually rational.
We provide two sufficient conditions for efficient implementation. First, we show that efficient implementation is feasible for generic information structures when the set of other agents' signals is large relative to the size of the set of states of nature or each agent's signal space is small relative to the size of the other agents' signal spaces (Propositions 1 and 2). The mechanism that we use to implement an efficient social choice rule can be regarded as a version of the expected externality mechanism (d'Aspremont and Gérard-Varet [8] , Arrow [2] ).
Another sufficient condition for efficient implementation is the existence of semirobust lotteries (Proposition 3). A set of semi-robust lotteries for an agent is a menu of payments such that acquiring more information than the suggested level would not help the agent make a better choice from the menu. We also provide sufficient conditions for the existence of semi-robust lotteries (Proposition 4).
Next, we show that full surplus extraction is related to the existence of robust lotteries, which are semi-robust lotteries that are fair, i.e. give the agent an expected payoff of 0. We provide two sufficient conditions for full surplus extraction. First, full surplus extraction is Bayesian incentive compatible and interim individually rational if the hypothesis of Proposition 1 is satisfied and, in addition, we can find robust lotteries given some private signal realization and the suggested level of information acquisition (Proposition 5). Another sufficient condition for full surplus extraction drops the hypothesis of Proposition 1 and, instead, requires the existence of robust lotteries for every private signal realization rather than just one realization (Proposition 6). A sufficient condition for the existence of robust lotteries for an agent is that the agents' signal space is no larger than either the set of states of nature or other agents' signal space (Proposition 7).
Our sufficient conditions for efficient implementation and full surplus extraction apply to environments where values are interdependent and agents' information is correlated.
2 With independent information, it is known that efficient implementation is incentive compatible if and only if values are private (Bergemann and Välimäki [4] , Stegeman [21] ). With positively interdependent values (and independent information), agents have an incentive to acquire more information than the socially optimal level (Bergemann, Shi and Välimäki [3] , Bergemann and Välimäki [4] ).
Finally, we show that most of our results hold under much weaker conditions if we relax exact efficient implementation to approximately efficient implementation (Propositions 8 and 9). Each agent's incentive constraints and interim individually rational constraints are more easily satisfied when the other agents' signals are more informative, i.e. the other agents acquire more information. For exact efficiency, the level of information acquisition must be at the efficient level. For approximate efficiency, however, we can dispense with this upper bound by letting agents acquire the maximum amount of information with small probability. 3 In this way, we can exploit the maximum amount of information with very little reduction in efficiency. 4 Crémer and McLean [7] show that if agents' are costlessly endowed with correlated information, then full surplus extraction is Bayesian incentive compatible and interim individually rational. Neither full surplus extraction nor efficiency is assured under their condition in our setting with information acquisition. We provide an example (Example 2) in which even efficient implementation is impossible when private signals are correlated as in Crémer and McLean [7] conditional on the efficient level of information acquisition. Parreiras [19] shows that full surplus extraction may fail when each agent obtains two kinds of information exogenously: his payoff type and the informativeness of his type about the other agents' types. In our model, agents do not know their own type and acquire information about the types of all agents endogenously. Obara [18] generalizes the necessary and sufficient condition for full surplus extraction in [7] to the setting where agents can take actions to change the distribution of their payoff-relevant types. The condition in Obara [18] is different from our condition because private signals cannot change the distribution of payoffrelevant types in our setting of pure information acquisition. Bikhchandani [6] shows that full surplus extraction fails if an agent can acquire costly information about other agents' types.
5 Unlike in our paper, agents are fully and costlessly informed about their own type in [6] .
Neeman [17] notes that it is essential for the full-extraction result of Crémer and McLean that the belief of each agent pins down the payoff type of the agent, i.e. beliefs determine preferences (BDP property). This property is not necessarily satisfied in more general type spaces. 6 Heifetz and Neeman [14] establish that the BDP assumption is non-generic in a certain sense in the set of priors on the (privatevalues) universal type space.
The full-rank condition of Crémer and McLean [7] is necessary for the existence of robust lotteries but not sufficient. Condition B of d'Aspremont and Gérard-Varet [9] is necessary and sufficient for balanced budget implementation. Both [9] and [7] study environments without information acquisition. 7 We discuss the relationship between semi-robust lotteries and Condition B of [9] in Remark 3(ii) below. The connection between (semi-)robust lotteries and the Crémer and McLean full-rank condition is discussed after Proposition 4 and before Proposition 5.
The model is presented in section 2. In section 3 we provide examples showing the failure of full surplus extraction and of efficient implementation. Sufficient conditions for efficient implementation and for full surplus extraction are presented in sections 4 and 5, respectively. We discuss how approximate efficient implementation relaxes our sufficient conditions in section 6. Some proofs are in an appendix.
The Model
Consider a set of agents N = {1, 2, . . . , n}, n ≥ 2. The state of nature ω ∈ Ω, where Ω is a finite set, determines agents' payoffs. The state is (usually) not observable by anyone. Agent i can take an action a i from A i = {1, ..., K} to acquire information about hidden state variableω.
8 Agent i observes a sequence of k private signals s
Thus, the assumption that each agent can access the same number K of signals is without loss of generality. Let K i be the largest number such that |S i,K i | > 1. Lets
= (s i,k+1 , ...,s i, ), > k be a sequence of agent i's k + 1th signal to th signal. Let We assume that private signals are conditionally independent across agents given state ω. Let p i (s K i |ω) be the probability ofs
|ω) be the distribution of the first k signals given ω. Similarly, define p
We make a full support assumption:
Let q be the prior distribution over Ω. Then agent i's belief aboutω given that agent i selected a i = k and observeds
. 8 We usex for a random variable and x for its realization.
5
Let M i (k) be a basis of the subspace |Ω| that is orthogonal to the subspace in
The conditional probability distributions d −i (ω|s
Let X be a compact set of outcomes. The monetary transfer from agent i to the mechanism designer is denoted t i ∈ . Agent i's cost of information acquisition c i (a i ) is non-decreasing in a i and the cost of minimum information is 0, i.e.,
9 Agent i's utility over outcome x, money transfer t i , and information acquisition decision a i takes a quasi-linear form
where u i : X × Ω → + is agent i's state-dependent continuous utility function on X. Each agent has a large enough supply of the money commodity so that the budget constraint is not binding.
where s a = (s a 1 1 , ..., s an n ). Thus, agents' induced utilities are interdependent.
An information structure is a set of states, a set of signals, a set of action profiles, a set of (conditional) distributions over states and signals: (Ω, S, A, q, p), where S = S 1 × · · · × S n , A = A 1 × · · · × A n , and p = (p 1 , . . . , p n ). A mechanism design problem is an information structure together with an outcome set, utility functions, and cost functions: (Ω, S, A, q, p, X, u, c) where u = (u 1 , . . . , u n ) and c = (c 1 , . . . , c n ).
A social choice function f : S → X maps agents' (reported) signals to outcomes in X. A social choice rule (a, f ) is an information acquisition recommendation for each agent and a social choice function. A payment function t : S → n maps agents' signals to transfers from the agents to the mechanism designer. A mechanism (a, f, t) is a social choice rule and a payment function t = (t 1 , . . . , t n ). For any mechanism (a, f, t), we assume without loss of generality that f and t are measurable with respect to S a = i S a i i , i.e. f and t do not depend on s
when action a i = k is recommended to agent i. 10 Thus we often write f (s
is implemented when we examine various constraints regarding agent i.
The mechanism designer and agents play the following game. First, the mechanism designer proposes a mechanism (a, f, t). Next, each agent i covertly chooses an information acquisition level ∈ {1, · · · , K}, observes the corresponding private signals i , and then decides whether to accept the mechanism or not; if he decides to accept, then agent i reports his signal to the mechanism designer (simultaneously with all the other agents). The mechanism designer implements the outcome f (s) and collects transfers t(s) based on the reported signal profile s. We assume that the amount of information each agent acquires and whether or not each agent accepts the mechanism is not observable to the other agents. If an agent does not participate, his interim payoff, ignoring any information acquisition cost, is zero. (ii) We consider situations where the principal has very little control over agents' information acquisition process. Information gathering is covert and whether or how much information is gathered by an agent is not observed by anyone else. In particular, there is no control over the timing of information acquisition. Thus, if asked to gather a i = k pieces of information, agent i may first observẽ s i , < k and then decide whether he wishes to pay an additional c i ( +1)−c i ( ) to observes i, +1 , and so on. The agent may also choose to observe s k,
With the exception of Propositions 5, 8 and 9 (see paragraph immediately after the proof of Proposition 5), we can permit the agents to collect information in this manner, a process we call sequential information acquisition within agents. 10 For any (Bayesian) implementable mechanism (a, f, t), there exist S a measurable social choice function f and payment function t that are implementable and generate exactly the same distribution of allocation and transfers. 11 Note that the notion of efficiency would be different once such sequential information acquisition is taken into account. We may like each agent to stop acquiring information early or late conditional (iii) We do not consider sequential information acquisition across agents. If the principal can control the timing of information acquisitions and make later acquisitions of information by an agent contingent on realizations of earlier acquisitions of information by other agents, then it may be possible to achieve greater efficiency by forcing the agents to acquire information sequentially.
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Under certain additional assumptions Propositions 1 and 2 can be extended to the case with sequential information acquisition across agents. See remark 2(iv) after Proposition 1.
We consider a pure-strategy perfect Bayesian equilibrium, where agents are sequentially rational given their subjective belief computed via Bayes' rule at all private histories. As we are interested in efficiency and full surplus extraction, without loss of generality we restrict attention to mechanisms in which every agent always accepts the mechanism in equilibrium.
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Bayesian Incentive Compatibility
Bayesian incentive compatibility requires that each agent gathers exactly the amount of information specified by the mechanism designer and truthfully reports his signal. Suppose that the mechanism designer wants to implement a ∈ A with a i = k. Assume that each agent j = i gathers information a j and suppose that agent i gathers information ∈ A i = {1, . . . , K}. The mechanism (a, f, t), with a i = k, satisfies agent i's Bayesian incentive compatibility constraint if for all ∈ A i ,
≥ E max max
This constraint takes into account the possibility that an agent may take any information gathering action and after observing his signal may not participate or may participate but lie about his signal.
on realizations of his private signals (without any knowledge of information acquired by others). With some minor modification, our sufficient conditions for efficient implementation and full surplus extraction are still valid with respect to this stronger notion of efficiency. 12 Gershkov and Szentes [13] characterizes the optimal voting mechanism with sequential information acquisition without monetary transfer when agents have identical preferences. 13 As agents' participation decisions are simultaneous and all agents participate in equilibrium, we do not need to explicitly consider the possibility that some agents do not participate. Thus we omit a detailed description of the mechanism after any non-participation. For completeness, one may assume that if one or more agents do not accept the mechanism, then an ex post efficient outcome for participating agents is implemented.
Constraint (2) also implies interim individual rationality on the equilibrium path. If agent i selects a i = k and opts out only when observing s k i (otherwise agent i participates and reports his signal truthfully), his incentive constraint would reduce to the following interim individual rationality constraint:
Consider a mechanism design problem (Ω, S, A, q, p, X, u, c) and a social choice rule (a, f ). If there exists t such that (2) is satisfied for each agent i then (a, f ) can be implemented in this mechanism design problem.
14 An ex post efficient social choice function given a ∈ A is f * a : S → X that is S a measurable and satisfies
As f * a is S a measurable, we denote it as f * a (s a ). Let
be the ex post maximized social surplus given (a, s a ) and let V (a) := E [V (a,s a )|a] be the ex ante maximum social surplus given a ∈ A. Then, a * is an (ex ante) efficient information acquisition level if
Efficient implementation is possible when (a * , f * a * ) can be implemented as an outcome of the Bayesian game induced by some mechanism (a * , f * a * , t). Note that, if agent i deviates to a i = a * i , an ex post efficient outcome given (a i , a * −i ) need not be implemented.
We consider two possible objectives for the mechanism designer: efficiency and profit maximization. The two objectives need not be in conflict and are simultaneously satisfied if the mechanism designer is able to implement an efficient social choice rule and extract the entire surplus.
Two Examples
In the first example below full surplus extraction is not possible, and in the second example efficient implementation (and therefore also full surplus extraction) is not possible. In these examples, the information structure satisfies the full-rank condition of Crémer and McLean [7] at the efficient level of information acquisition. Nonetheless, that does not prevent agents from acquiring more information than the efficient level.
Example 1: Impossibility of full surplus extraction
There are two symmetric agents α and β. A single indivisible object is to be allocated to either α or β. Each agent's valuation is the sum of a private value and a common value:
The value of X i depends on whether the stateω is ω α or ω β . This dependence is shown in table below.
Each of the states ω α and ω β is realized with probability 0.5.
Each agent i costlessly observes signals i ∈ {ω α , ω β } aboutω (i.e., X i ). Agents' signals are independent conditional on the true state. Each agent's signal is correct with probability q > 0.5 (i.e. Pr(s i = ω y |ω = ω y ) = q, where y = α, β).
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The common valueṼ is either 0 or ∆ > 0, both equally likely. Moreover, the distribution ofṼ is independent of the stateω:
Each agent can obtain perfect information about the realized value ofṼ at cost c v > 0. However, acquisition of this costly information is inefficient as it does not increase allocative efficiency.
Assume that > 0 is small enough so that it is ex post efficient to allocate the object to agent α if both agents' signals are ω α . When at least one agent's signal is ω β , then the object must be allocated to agent β for efficiency. It is ex ante efficient that neither agent gathers costly information aboutṼ .
In a full surplus extraction mechanism, no agent acquires information aboutṼ and the ex post efficient rule is implemented. We focus on agent α. In this mechanism, if 15 Conditional independence is not essential for this example. The joint distribution of (s α , s β ,ω) may, instead, be as assumed in Example 2 below. agent α participates, his payment as a function of the agents' reports is U α (s α , s β ) + t α (s α , s β ) where
otherwise.
and t α are Crémer-McLean lotteries, 16 which guarantee truth-telling conditional on participation. But if ∆ is large relative to c v agent α can make positive expected surplus by gathering information aboutṼ and participating only if (s α ,Ṽ ) = (ω α , ∆). The expected surplus from this strategy is
Efficient implementation is possible in this example. Let the payments of the two agents be t i (s α , s β ) − δ, i = α, β, where t i are Crémer-McLean lotteries and δ > 0. Each agent makes at least δ > 0 if he participates truthfully and, for large enough t i , makes negative expected surplus if he participates and lies about his signal. Based on the agents' (truthful) reports, the ex post efficient rule is implemented.
Example 2: Impossibility of efficient implementation 17 The information structure and valuations are the same as in Example 1, with two changes. First, instead of one signal, each agent i may observe two signals aboutω: s i,1 ∈ {ω α , ω β } ands i,2 ∈ {ω α , ω β }. Agents can acquire the additional signals i,2 at cost c ω > 0. This second signal completely reveals the true state. Second, the first signals i,1 need not be conditionally independent across agents given true state, as in Example 1. We consider a general joint distribution on private values and common value except that we assume Pr(
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Assume that > 0 is small and c v is large as in Example 1. We also assume that c ω is large enough. Then the efficient rule is the same as in Example 1: Agents do not acquire information aboutṼ ors i,2 and the object is allocated to α if (s α,1 , s β,1 ) = (ω α , ω α ), otherwise it is allocated to β.
We show that this efficient rule is not Bayesian implementable. Suppose, to the contrary, that there exists a Bayesian incentive-compatible efficient mechanism. By assumption, agent α truthfully reportss α,1 without acquirings α,2 or information aboutṼ . That is, α follows the efficient rule.
Let t β (s α,1 , s β,1 ) be the transfer from agent β as a function of the agents' reports. Consider two possible deviations by agent β which involve gathering information aboutṼ at cost c v .
Deviation 1: Gather information aboutṼ . If (s β,1 ,Ṽ ) = (ω α , ∆), then lie and reports β,1 = ω β ; otherwise participate with a truthful report ofs β,1 .
This deviation is not profitable if:
Hence we have
(Recall that the size of ∆ does not affect the efficient rule.) This is intuitive. Agent β has an incentive to secure a win by announcing ω β when he knows thatṼ = ∆ and his signal is ω α . Hence it must be costly for agent β to pretend to have observed ω β when he observed ω α .
Deviation 2: Gather information aboutṼ . If (s β,1 ,Ṽ ) = (ω β , 0), then lie and report s β,1 = ω α ; otherwise participate with a truthful report ofs β,1 .
By assumption, there exists λ ∈ (0, 1) such that Pr(
Since the left-hand side converges to ∞ as ∆ → ∞ by (5) and the second term of the right-hand side is bounded above independent of ∆ by (6), it must be the case
Finally, let Q y (ω z ) be β's expected payoff (including utility and payments) given that the true state is ω z and β announced ω y , where y, z ∈ {α, β}. For example,
Using Q y (ω z ), we can rewrite the incentive constraint (4) as follows.
Intuitively, this is the incentive constraint with respect to a deviation in which, without gathering information aboutṼ , β always announces ω β , plus some adjustment terms (the second term and the third term on the right-hand side). The adjustment terms reflect the difference between this simple deviation and Deviation 1: conditional on (s β,1 ,Ṽ ) = (ω α , 0), agent β would report truthfully and lose with positive probability, but save the expected payments
We know that the right-hand side of the inequality above increases without a bound as ∆ increases, thus the left-hand side increases without a bound as ∆ increases. Hence, either
Therefore, it is profitable for agent β to know the true value ofω. As this potential profit grows without bound as ∆ increases and the cost of obtaining the second signal -which reveals the true state of natureω -is constant, agent β would prefer to acquire the second signal for a large enough ∆. This proves that the ex ante efficient mechanism is not Bayesian incentive compatible in any mechanism when ∆ is large enough.
Efficient Bayesian Implementation
In this section, we provide two sufficient conditions for efficient implementation by pure strategy perfect Bayesian equilibrium. It is difficult to obtain efficient implementation when one agent's signal is significantly more informative than the information of all the other agents. For example, imagine an extreme case where only one agent holds all relevant information. Then this informed agent would announce any signal that implements the best allocation for him, which may not be socially optimal. Therefore, we need that each agent is not too "informationally large" in a sense made precise below. 19 Our sufficient conditions for efficient implementation are likely to hold when S −i is large relative to S i for every i ∈ N .
Expected Externality Mechanism
Our first result shows that efficient implementation is possible when the signals of other agents are rich enough given the efficient level of information acquisition. Proof
Consider a S
Let Γ i (K) be a |Ω| × |M i (K)| matrix with the vectors in M i (K) as its column vectors. By assumption, the number of independent column vectors of P −i and Γ i (K) is |Ω|.
Next we verify that a * i = k and f * a * can be implemented with transfer t i just defined. In the following, we assume that agent i never opts out without loss of generality because we can decrease t i by any constant. The optimality of a * i = k and truthful reporting follow from the fact that ω E −t i ( s 
by the definition of t i . Note that this is the expected social welfare (without information acquisition cost) of allocation f * a * ( s 20 Clearly there exists a S (k,a * −i ) measurable t i that satisfies
This means that the expected externality on agent j = i caused by agent i's report can be internalized through transfers ω by ω. Furthermore, we can do this without eliciting i's true signal because the state of nature is a sufficient statistic for the signals of agent j = i (however see remark 2(ii) below).
More generally, d −i (·|s
does not have to span |Ω| as the proposition shows. Notice that agent i's transfer does not need to replicate the expected externality ω by ω exactly as long as it replicates the expected externality at the interim stage conditional on i's signal. This can be done more easily when agent i's signal is not very informative, i.e. when the size of S K i is relatively small, in which case M i (K) is large. This is why the rank of M i (K) also matters for efficient implementation.
Remark 2 (i) Unlike d'Aspremont and Gérard-Varet [8]
, we do not obtain budget-balance for free. The budget-balancedness in [8] follows from the fact that agent i's transfer depends only on the outcome and his report, not on the other agents' reports. In our mechanism, agent i's transfer needs to depend on the other agents' reports to evaluate the expected externality of i's report conditional on each realization of ω.
(ii) When private signals are not conditionally independent, this proposition holds when the assumption is modified as follows. Let p independent, then we can find a transfer t i that satisfies
The rest of the proof is the same.
(iii) The contribution of this proposition is to provide a sufficient condition for efficient implementation when agents' signals are correlated. When agents's signals are independent and values are private, we already know that the VCG mechanism achieves efficient implementation (Bergemann and Välimäki [4] ).
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When agents's signals are independent and values are interdependent, efficient Bayesian implementation cannot be obtained even in a very simple setting. This follows from the revenue equivalence theorem and the negative result of [4] , as noted in Bergemann, Shi, and Välimäki [3] .
(iv) Proposition 1 extends to sequential information acquisition. Information acquisition can be sequential in two senses, as described in Remark 1(ii) and 1(iii): sequentiality within agents and sequentiality across agents. For within agents sequentiality, an optimal information acquisition rule is defined as a profile of individual stopping rules. Proposition 1 extends to this case immediately with a minor change of assumptions because each agent's payoff is perfectly aligned with social welfare by construction.
Next, consider a mechanism with sequential information acquisition across agents where each agent's information acquisition is a one-time decision, but each agent can condition his decision on the information acquired by the other agents. 22 In this case, an optimal information acquisition rule consists of a contingent plan about which agent should acquire information and when information acquisition should be stopped. This is the problem studied by Gershkov and Szentes [13] in the context of voting mechanisms. Although there is no conflict of interest among agents and the information acquisition technology is the same across agents, efficient implementation is not feasible in [13] because monetary transfers are not available. As we allow for monetary transfer, we can implement the efficient allocation under relatively weak assumptions. Our efficient mechanism would recommend to each agent one by one how much information to acquire conditional on already acquired information, without revealing any acquired information to the agents. The assumption we need to extend Proposition 1 to this case is that the signals of the subset of agents J ⊆ N \{i} who preceded agent i in acquiring information are informative enough about the true state 21 In our model, this is the case if ω = (ω 1 , ..., ω n ), only ω i affects agent i's utility, and agent i's signal is informative about ω i only. 22 Of course it is possible to accommodate both types of sequential information acquisition.
conditional on agent i being called upon to acquire information at an efficient social choice rule. Revealing less information to agents, as done in [13] , is always a good thing for incentives. But it plays an additional role here because unobserved signals can be used to align each agent's preference with social welfare via monetary transfers.
It is clear from the above discussion that the sufficient condition in Proposition 1 is satisfied when S 
Proposition 2 Suppose that the efficient level of information acquisition is unique
for an open and dense set of (q, p) for a fixed (Ω, S, A, X, u, c). Then efficient implantation is possible for mechanism design problem (Ω, S, A, q, p, X, u, c) for an open and dense set of (q,
for each i.
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Proof: By assumption, we can restrict our attention to a subset of (q, p) where a * is unique. First, suppose that S First we show that this set is open. Because X is compact and u i is continuous for every i ∈ N , the maximized social welfare is continuous with respect to (q, p) given every action profile by the maximum theorem. As there are a finite number of action profiles, this implies that the unique efficient action profile a * is locally constant. Then the set of above linearly independent vectors remain linearly independent locally. This proves openness.
Next we show that this set is dense. Take any (q, p) and let a * be the associated efficient action profile. Note that we can always find p −i such that p a * −i −i assigns probability 1 to different s a * −i −i for different ω when this assumption is satisfied ( S 1 j ≥ 2 is used here). Consider a |Ω| × |S −i | matrix where each row corresponds to p −i (·|ω) for a particular ω. Then the matrix associated with p −i is full row rank. Define p −i (t), t ∈ [0, 1] by p j (t)(·|ω) := t p j (·|ω) + (1 − t)p j (·|ω), j = i. We have a oneparameter family of conditionally independent distributions that connect p −i and p −i . It can be shown that the matrix associated with p −i (t) (and p a * −i −i (t)) is full-row rank for almost all t (Fudenberg, Levine and Maskin [12] ). Hence we can find p arbitrary close to p such that p 
Semi-Robust Lotteries
Next we turn to a complementary sufficient condition under which efficient implementation is obtained. A payment function can be regarded as a set of lotteries by which an agent, based on his information, bets on the announcements of other agents. A set of lotteries is semi-robust for agent i given a = (k, a −i ) if agent i cannot make a better choice by acquiring more information than a i = k. More precisely, given a = (k, a −i ), a S a measurable function t i : S → is semi-robust if
for any s By using semi-robust lotteries for Bayesian implementation, we can simultaneously discourage agents from acquiring more information and from acquiring less information than the target level. It does not pay for an agent to acquire more information in terms of expected payments. It is costly to acquire less information because the agent would be more likely to make a wrong choice of semi-robust lottery with less information.
Proposition 3
Suppose that there exist semi-robust lotteries for every i ∈ N given an efficient level of information acquisition a * for a mechanism design problem (Ω, S, A, q, p, X, u, c).
Then a * and the ex post efficient allocation f * a * can be implemented.
Proof: Let t i be semi-robust lotteries for agent i given a * . We show that if monetary transfers t * i = bt i , for some very large b > 0, are used then it is Bayesian incentive compatible for agent i to acquire information a * i and truthfully report his signal when f a * is implemented.
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Participation constraints. We can assume without loss of generality that t * i is non-positive and that agent i's expected surplus under truthful participation is non-negative. Hence agent i would accept the mechanism (a * , f * a * , t * ).
Deviation to acquire more information. Suppose that a * i = k < K and agent i chooses action a i = K and observes (s will not change the implemented outcome. Hence agent i does not gain anything by acquiring information a i = K. In fact agent i is worse off as acquiring more signalss k,K i is costly. The same proof shows that agent i has no incentive to take action a i = ∈ {k + 1, . . . , K − 1} instead of a i = k.
Deviation to acquire less information. Suppose that agent i chooses a i < k, i.e., acquires less information than he would in equilibrium. Since t i is semi-robust, h i (·|s , where the only kth signal is different. This means that agent i cannot announce the realized k digit signal with probability 1 if he acquires less than k signals. Hence the expected transfer from agent i given a i < k would be strictly more than when a i = k. Again we can choose b large enough so that this expected loss outweighs any gain from saving the cost of information acquisition. Therefore this type of deviation is not profitable either.
The argument in the last paragraph of the proof implies that semi-robust lotteries ensure efficient implementation even when information acquisition is sequential within agents. If agent i chooses action a i = < k and after observing his signal decides not to gather signals ,k i , then participation yields a negative payoff. If, instead, he does not participate his payoff is −c i ( ). By subtracting a large enough constant from t i , the mechanism designer can ensure that it pays agent i to gather the additional signal 24 The proof shows that any allocation f : S → X can be implemented. 
for any X i (ω) = X i . SinceṼ andω are independent, the above strict inequalities hold even when conditioned on realized values of V . Hence, such t i is a semirobust lottery. Hence efficient implementation is possible in Example 1. On the other hand, semi-robust lotteries do not exist in Example 2 given the additional signals i,2 .
(ii) Consider a standard mechanism design problem without information acquisition. In this environment, Condition B of d'Aspremont and Gérard-Varet [9] is necessary and sufficient for budget-balanced implementation of every social choice function:
∃t : S → n s.t. i∈N t i (s) = 0, ∀s
It is well known that the second condition is necessary and sufficient for implementation of every social choice function (See, for example, Aoyagi [1] ). This second condition implies that t i is a semi-robust lottery for agent i in an environment without information acquisition and is equivalent to assuming that all conditional distributions are distinct, i.e. h i (·|s i ) = h i (·| s i ) for any s i , s i = s i . Now introduce information acquisition and suppose that (k, a −i ) is chosen. Then the corresponding condition is that h i (·|s 
But this is not enough for efficient implementation in our setting because agent i's belief conditional on (s
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In our setting with information acquisition, it may not be immediately clear whether there exist semi-robust lotteries for each agent. Below we provide a sufficient condition for the existence of semi-robust lotteries and, by Proposition 3, for efficient implementation.
only by placing zero weight on
Suppose that we can order S
.. in such a way that, given a = (k, a −i ), we can sequentially separate them one by one after eliminating the preceding elements, i.e. s The proof of this proposition is in the appendix.
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This sequential separability condition is similar to, but not directly comparable with Crémer and McLean [7] 's full-rank condition for full surplus extraction, as there is no information acquisition in [7] . In our terminology, Crémer and McLean's condition --that the belief of any type of an agent should not be a convex combination of other types of that agent --is equivalent to saying that every s i ∈ S i can be separated from S i simultaneously. On the other hand, the above sufficient condition for (8) is that agent i's signals can be separated sequentially in some order. Thus, without information acquisition, (8) is weaker than Crémer and McLean's condition. 25 This suggests that information acquisition does not introduce any additional constraint when implementing the most informative action a i = K. This is in fact the case. If h i (·|s
for every i, then there exist semi-robust lotteries given a i = K for every i. Hence, any efficient allocation (in fact any allocation) is implementable in this case. 26 The proof also provides a somewhat technical necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of semi-robust lotteries.
Full surplus extraction
Full surplus extraction occurs in a mechanism design problem if it is Bayesian incentive compatible and interim individually rational for agents to acquire the ex ante efficient information level and truthfully report their signals while the mechanism designer implements the ex post efficient rule and collects transfers such that each agent's interim expected utility is always zero. We need to strengthen the definition of semi-robust lotteries of section 4 to obtain full surplus extraction.
For such a function π i , we call a set of lotteries π i ( s
robust lotteries. If the left-hand side of (8) equals zero, then the semi-robust lotteries t i are robust. If π i satisfies (9) and (10) We provide two sufficient conditions for full surplus extraction, both of which require existence of robust lotteries. Proposition 5 is similar to Proposition 1 and Proposition 6 is similar to Proposition 3 in their respective hypotheses. The proofs, however, are different.
Proposition 5
Consider an information structure (Ω, S, A, q, p). Fix any information acquisition decision a = (a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a n ). Suppose that there are |Ω| independent vectors among d −i (·|s
and M i (K) in ∆ (Ω) for every i ∈ N . Also suppose that there exists a robust lottery at some s
i for every i. Then for any mechanism design problem on this information structure and any social choice function f , the social choice rule (a, f ) can be implemented while every agent's expected surplus is fully extracted. 
This implies that there exists S k,a −i measurable transfer t i : S → that satisfies the following conditions for every s k i and s
As there exists robust lotteries at some s k i ∈ S k i given a = (k, a −i ), we can define another S k,a −i measurable transfer t i : S → that satisfies
By multiplying t by some number and subtracting a constant from it, we can replace the first equality with
without loss of generality. We can also assume without loss of generality that the left-hand side of the above strict inequality is so large that agent i does not have incentive to announce s k i when he did not observe s k i independent of his information acquisition level.
Now define S
k,a −i measurable transfer t i by t i := t i + t i for each i ∈ N . This transfer implements (a, f ) and extracts every agent's surplus fully. Equation (12) implies that t i extracts agent i's interim expected utility given any announcement and any level of information acquisition by agent i. Agent i's incentive constraints and participation constraints are satisfied at every history at the interim stage, ignoring t i . On the other hand, t i is designed so that its interim expected value is
if and only if agent i acquires at least a i = k, observes and announces although it was not observed). Then agent i's ex ante value from this transfer is exactly c i (k). Since information acquisition is costly, it is optimal for agent i to choose a i = k and always announce his signal truthfully. Clearly agent i's surplus is fully extracted.
Proposition 5 holds only for simultaneous information acquisition but not for sequential information acquisition within agents. If an agent knows, after acquiring s i , < k, that he will not observe s k i , he will drop out and save his information gathering costs c i (k) − c i ( ).
The next proposition shows that, if there exists robust lotteries at all signal realizations rather than only one for all players, then full surplus extraction is obtained without any additional assumption.
Proposition 6
Consider an information structure (Ω, S, A, q, p). Fix an information acquisition decision a = (a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a n ). Suppose that there exist robust lotteries for each agent i given a. Then for any mechanism design problem on this information structure and any social choice function f , the social choice rule (a, f ) can be implemented such that each agent's interim expected surplus is zero.
Proof: Fix any a and let a i = k. Let f be a S a measurable social choice function for a mechanism design problem on this information structure. Let π i be a robust function for agent i given a. Define
where λ > 0 and g i is a S a measurable function defined as
It is straightforward to check that the mechanism (a, f, t) satisfies (3) with the lefthand side equal to c i (k).
By choosing λ sufficiently large we can ensure that for all s k i and s
where the inequality follows from (10). Thus, if agent i chooses a i = k, he has no incentive to lie or opt out after any realization of his signal.
Next, consider a deviation to < k. For any s i , s (10) implies that
Therefore,
Thus, by choosing λ sufficiently large again, we can ensure that for any < k and
Thus, after choosing a i = < k, agent i is better off not to participate, which yields a payoff of −c( ), rather than participate and lie about observing some s K i which, for λ large enough, yields a smaller payoff. Hence, this deviation is not profitable.
Finally, suppose that a i = > k. For the same reason as above, the optimal strategy is to announce s 
Hence such a deviation is not profitable either.
Recall that a * is the ex ante efficient information acquisition level and f * a * is the ex post efficient rule associated with a * for a mechanism design problem. The following is immediate.
Corollary 1 (Full surplus extraction.) If robust lotteries given a * exist for each agent i , then there exists a mechanism (a * , f * a * , t * ) that is incentive compatible, interim individually rational, and satisfies
The payment function used in the proof of Proposition 6 ensures that the left-hand side of (3) is equal to c i (k) for each s k i . Therefore, the reasoning in the paragraph immediately after Proposition 3 applies here as well and robust lotteries ensure full surplus extraction even under sequential information acquisition within agents.
Here is a characterization result for robust lotteries. The necessary and sufficient condition below is stronger than the sufficient condition of Proposition 4. This is not surprising as robust lotteries are semi-robust lotteries but not vice versa.
Proposition A (Bikhchandani [6] ). Robust lotteries exist given (k, a −i ) for agent i iff the set of linear combination of beliefs h −i |} for some a −i ∈ A −i , then robust lotteries for agent i given (a i , a −i ) exist for any a i ∈ A i and for a generic choice of (q, p). −i . This condition is satisfied more easily for agent i when the efficient level of information acquisition by agent j = i is higher. We show that these assumptions can be relaxed significantly if we only need to implement an almost efficient outcome. More specifically, we can use S The basic idea is to mix the most informative action and the efficient action.
Proof: If |S
There would be no significant loss in ex ante efficiency from doing so if we set the probability to play the most informative (but inefficient) action very small. On the other hand, the size of informational gain from using the most informative signals is independent of the size of this probability. This observation is not new. For example, Obara [18] and Rahman and Obara [20] do the same kind of exercise.
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As the basic logic behind all the results is very similar, we extend Proposition 3 here as an example to illustrate our general idea. We modify our previous mechanism as follows. Agent i takes an efficient action a * i with probability 1 − and takes a i = K with probability for some small > 0, then always reports the realized action and the realized signal (s a * i i or s K i depending on the action taken). One may view this as the mechanism designer recommending a * i with probability 1 − and a i = K i with probability , independently for each agent i.
We define the outcome and transfer as follows.
Allocation: Player i chooses the efficient information acquisition a * i with probability 1 − and the most informative action with probability . We always use the ex post efficient S a * measurable allocation. Note that the resulting outcome is not efficient when a * is not taken. However, this social choice rule is almost efficient ex ante because the efficient action a * is played with probability (1 − ) n ∼ 1.
Transfer: Agent i's transfer is 0 if there is at least one other agent who reports that he did not take the most informative action. If every other agent took the most informative action, then the S K −i measurable transfer that were previously defined for agent i when a * j = K j for every j = i is used, except that it is multiplied by This mechanism is not complete yet because we need to make agent i indifferent between taking k and K i . Agent i's expected utility minus expected transfer does not change whether he takes k or any > k. Hence agent i would simply lose c i ( ) − c i (k) by playing . To address this, we introduce additional lotteries for agent i such that agent i can get c i (K i ) − c i (k) reimbursed in expectation only when he acquires the maximum amount of information K i (otherwise the gain from these lotteries is negative).
This mechanism induces a perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium that generates (a * , f * a * ) with probability (1 − ) n . Since we can make as small as possible, we obtain approximately efficient Bayesian implementation. 
